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Schroder: Cosntitutional Law: Juvenile Courts and Double Jeopardy--An Oppor

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: JUVENILE COURTS AND DOUBLE
JEOPARDY-AN OPPORTUNITY FOR CHANGE*
Fainv. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973)
Eleven days after he was arrested for rape, petitioner, then sixteen years
old, was adjudicated a delinquent1 in juvenile court 2 and committed to
the Division of Youth Services for an indefinite period. Nine days later, petitioner was indicted for rape. The circuit court quashed the indictment
holding that prosecution of petitioner for rape would violate notions of
fundamental fairness and constitutional prohibitions against double
jeopardy3 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, 4 utilizing a balancing
test between fundamental fairness for the juvenile and society's interest in
being free from lawless acts. When the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
on appeal,5 petitioner requested and was granted a writ of habeas corpus by
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. 6 Rejecting
state contentions that petitioner was never placed in jeopardy because juvenile
proceedings were not criminal in nature,7 the court held that criminal prosecution of a person based on the same acts upon which a prior delinquency
adjudication had been founded would violate the double jeopardy clause.8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
and HELD, petitioner had been placed in jeopardy in the juvenile proceedeEDrroR's NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted in the winter 1974 quarter.
1. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §2, at 646, amending FLA. STAT. §39.01(9) (Supp. 1972).
This statute defines "delinquent child" as "a child who commits a violation of law, regardless of where the violation occurred, except a child who commits a juvenile traffic
offense and whose case has been transferred to the juvenile court by the court having
'jurisdiction." This provision is substantially the same as that in effect at the time of the
instant case.
2. Juvenile courts have been incorporated into the circuit court system since January
1, 1973. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §2, at 646, amending FLA. STAT. §39.01(1) (Supp. 1972).
3. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672, 674 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
4. Id. at 680.
5. R.E.F. v. State, 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1972).
6. Fain v. Duff, 364 F. Supp. 1192 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
7. Id. at 1196. The civil nature of juvenile proceedings was the basis of the Florida
court's refusal to strictly apply double jeopardy standards. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d
672, 679 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1971). It is interesting to note, however, that subsequent to the
R.E.F. decision the First District Court of Appeal in ruling on another juvenile case stated:
"To the extent that a final adjudicatory order of a juvenile court deprives a minor of his
liberty or restrains him in the free exercise thereof, it is clearly analogous to a judgment of conviction and sentence rendered in a criminal proceeding. Because the ultimate
effect of each type of final adjudication is essentially the same, the safeguards surrounding
the constitutional right of one convicted of a crime to a full appellate review of his judgment should be applied with equal force to the right of a minor adjudged to be in need
of juvenile court supervision .... " In re TA.F., 252 So. 2d 255, 258 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
8. 364 F. Supp. at 1196.
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ing and therefore the state's attempted reprosecution of petitioner as an adult
in criminal court violated constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy
and due process requirements of fundamental fairness. 9
Prior to 1969 the federal double jeopardy protection was not binding
on the states, 10 and double jeopardy objections to state prosecutions were
resolved through application of a due process standard based on concepts of
fundamental fairness."- In Benton v. Maryland,12 however, the Court found
the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection to be an element of
fourteenth amendment due process and thus applicable to the states.
This application of federal procedural protections to state criminal
courts has paralleled a gradual expansion of constitutional safeguards to individuals brought before the juvenile courts. Although not conferring all
rights available to adult criminal defendants,

3

In re Gault14 did grant ju-

veniles accused of crime and facing the prospect of a substantial period of
incarceration the right to counsel, confrontation, and notice of charges, as
well as the privilege against self-incrimination, when before the juvenile
courts.' 5 By holding that juvenile proceedings must meet due process requirements,6 the Gault Court "performed the significant function of piercing
the non-criminal facade of juvenile proceedings." 17 Following Gault, the Court
inIn re Winship18 implied that the application of any additional due process
elements to the juvenile courts would depend upon a weighing of the constitutional protection sought to be applied against the interest of the state
in maintaining a benevolent juvenile system.' 9 Most recently, McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania2 0 underscored the limited reach of Gault and emphasized a
9. 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973). The court was also required to rule on the jurisdictional basis upon which the district court considered petitioner's application for the writ
of habeas corpus. At the time of the district court action petitioner was in the custody
of the Division of Youth Services. The juvenile authorities had determined petitioner to
be rehabilitated and prepared for release, but refused to do so as release would subject
petitioner to immediate arrest based on the rape indictment. The instant court concluded
that, since the indictment was the sole cause of petitioner's confinement, it provided an
adequate basis for issuance of the writ. The validity of the court's determination as to
this and other jurisdictional issues, although providing a possible basis for reversal on
subsequent appeal, are beyond the scope of this comment.
10. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
11. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
12. 395 U.S. 784 (1969). The Benton Court discarded the fundamental fairness approach of Palko.
13. See Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY L.Q.
1, 3 (No. 4, Dec. 1967).
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
15. Id. at 33-55. See also Schultz & Pickrel, Developments in Juvenile Justice, [1972-1973]
ANNUAL SURVEY

OF

AMERICAN LAw 629, 631 (1973).

16. 387 U.S. at 30-31.
17. Note, Double Jeopardy and the Waiver of Jurisdiction in California's Juvenile
Courts, 24 STAN. L.REV. 874, 893 (1972).
18. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court held the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
applicable to the adjudicatory stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
19. Id. at 366.
20. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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concern for the perpetuation of the non-adversary juvenile court. Interpreting
Gault and Winship as placing primary emphasis on the factfinding process, 2'
the McKeiver Court refused to impose the jury trial guarantee on juvenile
court proceedings, 2 2 concluding it would neither enhance factfinding procedures nor significantly contribute to improvement of the juvenile system.

23

4
Traditionally, jeopardy was said to attach only in criminal proceedings.
2
5
Reasoning that juvenile proceedings are civil not criminal, rehabilitative
not punitive, 26 and that the proper role of the state vis-a-vis the juvenile
should be that of parens patriae,27 courts have generally held that jeopardy
does not attach.28 Since the decision in Gault, 9 however, this view has undergone significant change. 30 Application of the double jeopardy protection

21. 403 U.S. at 543.
22. Id. at 547, 550-51. The Court specifically outlined the appropriate test as a twofold one, namely: whether application of the right is necessary to the achievement of
fundamental fairness and whether it will be disruptive of the juvenile court system.
23. Id. at 545. The Court stated: "There is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial,
if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into
a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic
prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." For a discussion of the jury
and juvenile courts, see Comment, Constitutional Law: The Jury and the Juvenile Court,
24 U. FLA. L. REv. 385, 389 (1972).
24. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1212 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559-60 (D.C. Cir. 1959); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 151, 138 P.2d 503, 510 (1943). But see Van Hattan v. State, 97 Tex.
Crim. 123, 125, 260 S.W. 581, 582 (Ct. Crim. App. 1924), which found juvenile proceedings
to be criminal, not civil, and therefore held that juveniles were entitled to protection against
double jeopardy. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §16, at 536, amending FLA. STAT. §39.10(3) (1971),
substantially restates earlier codifications, providing: "An adjudication by a court that a
child, is a dependent or delinquent child, or a child in need of supervision, shall not be
deemed a conviction, nor shall the child be deemed to have been found guilty or to be a
criminal by reason that adjudication . . .." The availability of this provision as a basis
for argument against imposition of double jeopardy protection in juvenile proceedings
is questionable in light of decisions such as Gault, which look more to the substance and
potential impact of the proceeding than to its form.
26. See generally McLaughlin & McGee, Juvenile Court Procedure, 17 AIA. L. REV.
226 (1965).
27. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
28. See, e.g., People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (2d Dist. 1953);
In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524,
140 A.2d 914 (1958); In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1953).
29. Although Gault did not specifically deal with double jeopardy, a footnote to the
opinion referred with seeming approval to Sawyer v. Hauck, 245 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Tex.
1965), where criminal prosecution subsequent to an adjudication of delinquency based
on the same offense was held to be unconstitutional. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 n.26
(1967). Gault was decided before the double jeopardy prohibition was applied to the
states, and the Supreme Court has yet to be squarely confronted with the issue of its
applicability to juvenile proceedings.
30. See, e.g., Rice v. District of Columbia, 385 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1967); M. v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d
650 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968).
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in juvenile proceedings, unlike the right to jury trial, has generally received
favorable consideration from courts confronted with the issue. 3' The
primary impetus for this change was provided by United States v. Dickerson,32 where the District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
constitutional protection against being twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense should be applicable to all proceedings that may result in deprivation
33
of liberty.
The instant court, noting that petitioner's commitment to the Division
of Youth Services resulted from his violation of a criminal statute, adopted the
Dickerson rationale and concluded petitioner had been placed in jeopardy in
the juvenile proceeding.3 4 Thus, the court rejected the fundamental fairness
concept of McKeiver as the appropriate standard for determining whether
petitioner was entitled to assert the defense of double jeopardy.35 The majority distinguished McKeiver as dealing strictly with juveniles in juvenile
court.3 6 Reasoning that mere status as a juvenile cannot deprive an individual of rights enjoyed by adults in the criminal justice system, the majority determined that when, as in the instant case, the juvenile, is brought
before the criminal courts "the Constitution's command that no person shall
37
be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense unquestionably applies."
The court considered it immaterial that under Florida law38 petitioner could

31. See, e.g., Brown v. Cox, 467 F.2d 1255, aff'd on rehearing, 481 F.2d 622 (4th Cir.
1973); M. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971); In re
J., 17 Cal. App. d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (2d Dist. 1971); In re P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342, 490
P.2d 685 (1971); State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209 (1972). The United States Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same result on fundamental fairness grounds in a
case decided before the double jeopardy protection was applied to the states. Hultin v.
Beto, 396 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1968).
32. 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
33. Id. at 901. This position was subsequently reiterated by the court and the ultimate
test was said to be the outcome of the proceedings, not whether they are denominated
civil or criminal. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 486 (D.D.C. 1960).
34. 488 F.2d at 225 (5th Cir. 1973). In dissent Judge Ainsworth, citing numerous cases
all but one of which were pre-Gault and all pre-Benton, endorsed the position of the Florida
appellate courts that petitioner was not denied fundamental fairness and that the plea of
double jeopardy should be denied. 488 F.2d at 227-28. For criticism of the Florida First
District Court of Appeal decision see Rudstein, Double Jeopardy and Juvenile Proceedings,
14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 266, 290 (1972).
35. 488 F.2d at 225.
36. Id.
37. Id. Citing with approval Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), where it was held
that consecutive state and municipal prosecutions for the same act violate the double
jeopardy clause, the instant court indicated that petitioner was being tried by the same
sovereign for the same offense upon which adjudication of delinquency was based. 488
F.2d at 226. This position has been strengthened by the incorporation of juvenile courts
into the circuit courts. See note 2 supra. For a subsequent look at the Waller case and its
impact upon double jeopardy in Florida, see Comment, Double Jeopardy: A Protection
or an Empty Promise?, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 838 (1973).
38. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 146, §1, at 698. With the exception of an additional requirement that no adjudicatory hearing be held within fourteen days of the date the juvenile
is taken into custody unless certain specific conditions are met, the provision presently in
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have been tried as an adult ab initio had he been indicted prior to the de-

linquency ruling.39 In addition, the majority dismissed allegations that the
juvenile court had engaged in improper procedures that deprived the state
of its interest in the litigation, determining that the juvenile court judge's
actions in not waiving jurisdiction to the criminal court were wholly consistent with state statutory provisions. 40 Thus, in concluding that jeopardy
attaches in an adjudication on the merits in a juvenile proceeding"l the
court recognized that once the juvenile is removed from the "benevolent,"
non-adversary atmosphere of the juvenile system, the rationale for not provid42
ing all constitutional guarantees has likewise been removed.
The instant court considerably narrowed the scope of its ruling by distinguishing McKeiver on the grounds that it concerned safeguards appropriate to purely juvenile proceedings rather than the rights of juveniles before
the criminal courts. 48 Thus, rather than extending Gault, Winship, and Mc-

Keiver, and making constitutional double jeopardy protections applicable in
juvenile proceedings, the instant case is limited to fulfilling the strict double
jeopardy mandate of Benton. The court's discussion of fundamental fairness,4" however, is inconsistent with this approach. A discussion of fundamental fairness would only appear apposite if the court were seeking to apply
double jeopardy safeguards to purely juvenile proceedings. Having taken the
position that considerations of fundamental fairness do prohibit petitioner's
reprosecution, 45 the instant court was presented with a clear opportunity to

effect is substantially a restatement of that in force at the time of the instant case. See Fla.
Laws 1973, ch. 231, §, at 648.
39. "In this case an indictment was not handed down until after the juvenile court
had invoked jurisdiction and committed [petitioner] to the department of youth services."
488 F.2d 218, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1973). In the instant case the State expressed fear that application of the double jeopardy prohibition would encourage a race by accused juvenile
offenders to secure an adjudication of delinquency in order to prevent subsequent criminal
prosecution. The court rejected those contentions, noting that in juvenile court the judge
acts for the state and, additionally, that the state was adequately represented by the state
attorney. Id. at 226. In the absence of a demand by the child and his parent or guardian
for trial as an adult, the decision concerning waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal court
is within the discretion of the juvenile judge. Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 231, §3, at 648, amending
FLA. STAT. §39.02(6)(a) (Supp. 1972). For an in-depth consideration of the interrelationship between waiver procedures and double jeopardy in Florida's juvenile courts, see
Commentary, Juvenile Court: Due Process, Double Jeopardy and the Florida Waiver Procedures, 26 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 300 (1974).
40. 488 F.2d at 226. Although advised that the rape charge was being referred to the
grand jury, the juvenile court refused the state's request for a waiver of jurisdiction to the
circuit court.
41. 488 F.2d at 225. This position has been favorably commented upon by the United
States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Brown v. Cox, 467 F.2d 1255, aff'd on rehearing,
481 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1973). Accord, see cases cited note 31 supra.
42. 488 F.2d at 225.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 226.
45. Id.
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follow the McKeiver rationale 46 and apply the double jeopardy protection to
juvenile proceedings in toto. Instead, the court charted an interstitial course
between juvenile and adult proceedings, leaving the full and ultimate impact
of the decision in question. Despite the limits of its rationale, however, the
instant case can be utilized to support the contention that double jeopardy
protections should apply to purely juvenile proceedings. Having reached the
fundamental fairness issue, the court, in order to satisfy the requirements of
McKeiver, need only have considered the possibility of any disruptive effect on
the juvenile process that might result from application of double jeopardy
safeguards.
"Double jeopardy" has been termed "the least litigated issue in the area
of procedural protections and constitutional rights in the juvenile courts. 47
Recent trends in state and federal court decisions,48however, clearly recognize
that the time has long since passed when the realities of the juvenile system
can be ignored. Consequences of a juvenile proceeding are often more harsh
than those faced by an adult convicted in the criminal court of the same
offense. 49 The "double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment [representing] a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage'' 50 should be
made equally available to all persons, regardless of age or the type of court
through which the state seeks to exercise jurisdiction over them. In failing
to utilize the instant case as a vehicle for application of the double jeopardy
protection to purely juvenile proceedings, the court has missed an opportunity for a much needed change.
MICHAEL A.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

SCHROEDER

See note 22 supra.
See Comment, supra note 24, at 1312.
See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1968).
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